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Abstract This paper reviews the history of cyclical and long wave analysis
and examines the evidence on changes in the momentum of economic growth
in 16 advanced capitalist countries from 1820 to 2001. It assesses the work of
the main Business Cycle Research Institutes in Western Europe the USA and
Russia, as well as that of Kondratieff, Kuznets, Schumpeter, Abramovitz and
the long-wave revivalists-Rostow, Mandel and Mensch. It concludes that the
existence of regular long-term rhythms in capitalist development is not pro-
ven, but distinguishes major changes in the momentum of growth due to
disturbances of an ad hoc character. The role of system shocks and historical
accidents is important but the role of policy error and success is also em-
phasised. It identifies five major phases of capitalist development since 1820.
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Jel Classification C82 Æ E01 Æ N10
This is a modified and updated version of chapter 4 in Maddison, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist
Development, OUP, 1991. It incorporates substantial improvements in the coverage of historical
statistics back to 1820, and updates my earlier analysis from 1989 to 2001. There is also extensive
new analytical material on long waves: (a) Vincent Barnett’s (1998) exciting and carefully re-
searched biography of Kondratieff provides a comprehensive assessment of his publications and
professional activity; (b) four volumes by Makasheva et al. (1998) contain new translations of a
substantial part of Kondratieff’s work; (c) an exhaustive analysis of these issues in the compen-
dium volumes of Christopher Freeman (1996) and Louc¸a˜ and Reijnders (1999); (d) the impressive
survey of the whole field by Freeman and Louc¸a˜ (2001).
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Capitalist development has not been smooth. There have been important
changes of momentum which are worthy of study, definition, and causal
interpretation. There have also been shorter-term fluctuations, usually called
business cycles. My primary interest is not in these, but in major changes in the
dynamics of growth which involved basic changes in the institutional-policy
mix and were usually initiated by some sort of ‘system shock’ which upset the
international economic order.
Before presenting my own diagnosis, it is useful to trace the history of
cyclical and wave analysis. In the past there has been extensive discussion of
long waves. Interest revived in the 1970s after a period when the long-wave
hypothesis was regarded as quaint and the business cycle obsolete.
1 Analysis of business cycles
Cyclical analysis started in 1856 with Clement Juglar (1819–1905) and 1862
with Jevons (1835–1882). Both emphasized periodicity in economic activity
whereas most earlier writers interpreted interruptions to growth as random
financial crises. Jevons work was largely concentrated on English experience
and had an idiosyncratic emphasis on the influence of sun-spots (1). Juglar’s
analysis was comparative. He concluded that cycles were roughly synchronous
in France, the UK, and USA. The evidence he assembled related mainly to
monetary phenomena-expansions or contractions in central bank activity,
rates of interest, prices of key commodities, etc., plus narrative ‘business an-
nals’. It is frequently asserted that Juglar found cycles of a characteristic
length of 9 years, but this is not in fact true. His cycles for France averaged
7 years with a range from 3 to 18 years, and for the UK 6 years with a range
from 2 to 10 years.
For several decades the quantitative indicators available to cyclical analysts
were similar to those used by Juglar, though they were later augmented to
include price indices, data on output and foreign trade. A more sophisticated
causal analysis (under-consumptionist) was also developed by the Russian
economist Mikhail Tugan-Baranowsky (1894, 1865–1919) in 1894 in his
analysis of cycles in the UK.
In the 1920s, institutes were set up in several countries to measure and
interpret variations in current economic activity, in historical perspective.
These included the Conjuncture Institute in Moscow and the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) in New York, both set up in 1920. The
London and Cambridge Economic Service started its Monthly Bulletin in
1923. In 1925, Ernst Wagemann, the President of the German Statistical Of-
fice, set up an officially financed Institut fur Konjunkturforschung in Berlin,
with a staff of 50, to brief decision-makers in the public and private sectors
with an up-to-date analysis of the economic situation (see Tooze 1999). In
1933 it became the Deutsches Institut f}ur Wirtschaftsforschung. The Institute
of Statistics in the Sorbonne in Paris, the Institutes of Statistics in the
Universities of Rome and Padua presided by Corrado Gini, and the League of
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Nations Committee of Experts on Economic Barometers started work in 1926.
The Osterreichisches Institut fur Konjuncturforschung, directed by Friedrich
von Hayek, started in Vienna in 1927 (see Mitchell 1927, pp 201–202). At this
time, most of these countries did not have national accounts (except Germany,
where they were initiated in 1929 and the USA from 1934), so their basic
analytical tools were not macro-measures of output, expenditure and income
but miscellaneous indicators of prices, financial transactions, commercial
activity, output of various agricultural, mining and manufacturing products.
They concentrated on business activity and generally ignored the role of
government. The heterogeneity of their indicators was a substantial problem
in measuring cross-country synchronicity of business cycle movements.
The ultimate refinement in this type of business cycle analysis was the
massive effort of the NBER, under the successive leadership of Wesley
Mitchell (1874–1948), and Arthur Burns (1904–1987). The first phase of their
research was preparation (a) of a huge databank of statistical indicators and
charts on production, construction, transport and communication, wholesale,
retail and foreign trade, wages and employment, currency, banking and
financial transactions (see Mitchell 1927), and (b) narrative chronologies of
past cycles (business annals). The annals were compiled by Willard Thorp
(1926), in liaison with associates in other countries, including von Hayek,
Aftalion, R. Kuczinski, and Kondratieff; they provided a cyclical periodisation
for 17 countries; for the UK and USA back to 1790, for other countries to the
mid-nineteenth century. With this material, NBER developed a series of
‘reference cycles’ for four countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, and the
USA) based mainly on monthly quantitative data, which started in 1854 for
the last two countries, in 1865 for France, and 1879 for Germany. The number
of monthly or quarterly series for the USA was 19 for 1860 rising to 811 in
1942 (plus 161 annual indicators). The monthly and quarterly series were
seasonally adjusted. For the three European countries the number of indica-
tors was much smaller. The NBER derived its ‘reference cycles’ by plotting
most of the information on charts in de-seasonalized form, and, by iterative
procedures of inspection, identifying the turning points of cycles by the size of
clusters of roughly concurrent fluctuations (Burns and Mitchell 1947, pp
20:78–79, and 82). Thus its central concept of economic activity was a fuzzy
cocktail rather than a clearly defined measure of aggregate economic activity.
The main purpose was to develop sensitive warning indicators of turning
points in business activity. These were classified as leading, coincident, or
lagging. The reference cycle became part of the official statistical armoury of
the USA for forecasting purposes, though it is now supplemented by the more
sophisticated econometric models of aggregate activity (quarterly GDP). For
the period 1857 to 1978 the NBER discerned 28 successive peak-to-trough
movements for the United States, i.e. a recession on average every 4 years,
with a variation in their incidence from two-and-a-half to nine-and-a-half
years. For other countries the average duration was found to be longer:
53 months for France, 62 for the UK and 64 for Germany for prewar years.
The NBER cycles were not adjusted to eliminate trend, so they were not
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measures of oscillation in economic activity. They registered recessions only
when there was an absolute fall in the relevant indicators (2).
The NBER technique of using monthly and rather volatile series picked up
more cycles than a GDP index based on annual data, and the ‘reference
cycles’ that did correspond with GDP movements did not always have exactly
the same dates (3). The NBER approach is a useful tool in interpreting
quantitative economic history, but a major problem is that it yields no satis-
factory measure of the amplitude of fluctuations because of the difficulty of
producing a meaningful summary measure from such heterogeneous data.
Thus one cannot use the reference cycle itself to distinguish major and minor
cycles, in the same way that one can with simpler measures of industrial
output or GDP.
Arthur Burns (1934), Production Trends in the United States since 1870 was
an attempt to look at longer term ‘trend cycles’, based on annual movement
(1870–1929) of commodity output indicators for 90 agricultural, mining and
industrial items and 14 for transport and communications. It analysed patterns
of growth and retardation for individual industries, but made no attempt to
measure their aggregate movement.
Although the bulk of NBER research in the 1920s was concentrated on
business cycles, there was also a feeble effort to measure national income of
the USA. Two studies were published in 1921, followed by Wilford King’s
unimpressive National Income and its Purchasing Power in 1930, which con-
tained no aggregate estimate nor any concept of what such an aggregate would
be. In 1930 Mitchell asked Simon Kuznets to take over the work on national
income. Kuznets migrated to the USA in 1922, after doing his undergraduate
studies in Kharkov. He did his Columbia Ph.D. thesis on cyles under Mitchell
in 1926 and worked in the Bureau in 1927–1929 on his post-doctoral mono-
graph Secular Movements in Production and Prices (1930). It resembled other
work in the Bureau in type of indicator, but Kuznets used only annual data,
had somewhat wider country coverage, much more ambitious decomposition
of time series, explored fluctuations over periods distinctly longer than busi-
ness cycles, and his analytical approach was influenced by the Russian tradi-
tion. From 1930 onwards his professional interests were transformed. He
blazed a new trail which he followed for the rest of his life, developing
comprehensive measures of aggregate activity and economic growth, first for
the United States, and then the rest of the world. He lost interest in the fuzzy
cocktail of indicators that continued to be Burns’delight, though he continued
his close association with the NBER, and was successful in persuading it to
undertake important studies on economic growth which buttressed his own
work (4).
2 Long-wave analysis
Although there was some discussion of the Great Depression (in prices) in
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the idea of recurrent long waves
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in capitalist development did not arouse much interest until after the First
World War, i.e., about 50 years later than cycle analysis, when the rhythm
of development had been very dramatically broken. The main long-wave
analysts were van Gelderen (1913), Kondratieff (1922, 1926, 1992, 1998),
Kuznets (1926, 1961, 1965), and Schumpeter. All drew heavily on cyclical
indicators to test their ideas quantitatively.
3 Van Gelderen (1891–1940)
Jacob van Gelderen was not the first to distinguish long waves, but he was
the first to measure them (5). He was a statistican in the municipality of
Amsterdam, later (1919–1933) chief statistician in Indonesia, and worked
thereafter in the Dutch Ministry of Colonies. As a civil servant, he wrote
under a pseudonym (Fedder, his mother’s maiden name). He was active in
the Jewish labour movement (Poale Zion) and his article on long waves
was published in 1913 in three successive issues of the Dutch Social-
Democratic party’s journal (De Nieuwe Tijd). This had been founded in
1896, on the the model of Die Neue Zeit, the organ of the German SDP
founded in 1883 by Karl Kautsky. Both journals had been vehicles for
Marxist discussion of the dynamics and prospects of capitalism-crises,
overproduction, likelihood of breakdown, and for reviews of books on
stages of capitalist development by Werner Sombart in 1902, and Rudolf
Hilferding in 1910. Van Gelderen mustered a good deal of statistical
material on wholesale price movements in Austria–Hungary, Belgium,
Canada England, France, Germany and the USA, foreign trade and gold
production, stock market activity and interest rates. Without any decom-
position of his time series, he concluded by inspecting his evidence in
graphical form, that there had been a long cycle of 45 years between 1850
and 1895. There were two phases-expansion and contraction. The former
he called a ‘‘spring tide’’ (1850–1873), when prices rose. In 1873–1895 there
was an ‘‘ebb tide’’ when prices fell. He discerned a second long wave
beginning in 1895. He demonstrated his waves most clearly by a technique
later adopted by Kuznets. He smoothed out shorter 10-year cycles in the
period 1845–1911, by presenting averages for overlapping decades (p 269)
of the Sauerbeck price index. He argued that movements of this kind were
inherent characteristics of the capitalist system associated with surges and
recessions in capital formation, expansions of the European capitalist orbit
to include north America and Australasia, fluctuations in gold production,
etc. However, he did not suggest that the system was threatened with
breakdown. One gets the impression that he felt these waves to be more or
less ineluctable and innocuous. Van Gelderen and his family committed
suicide in May 1940, when the Nazi army invaded the Netherlands.
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4 Kondratieff (1892–1938)
Nikolai Kondratieff was a Russian economist (a pupil of Tugan-Baranowsky),
who worked on agrarian problems and business cycles. His long wave analysis
was much more sophisticated than van Gelderen’s. He was very briefly vice
minister of food supply in 1917, in the Kerensky government preceding the
October revolution. Thereafter he taught in the Agricultural Academy,
worked on agrarian reform with Chayanov and Makarov and was the founder
and director (1920–1928) of the Business Cycle Research Institute in Moscow.
He was also a high-level policy advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture and the
Ministry of Finance in the 1920s. The Institute’s large staff (50 people) in-
cluded distinguished economists and statisticians: Eugen Slutsky, the expert
on mathematical decomposition of time series, A. A. Konus, who did pio-
neering work on consumer price indices and Albert Vainstein, who survived
and moved on from business indicators to macromeasurement. Its job was to
monitor the economic situation in the USSR and the major capitalist econo-
mies and to make economic forecasts. It was financed from the budget of the
Ministry (People’s Commissariat) of Finance.
Several of Kondratieff’s articles were published in translation and he
traveled abroad to establish contact with kindred researchers. From early June
1924, accompanied by his wife, he spent a month in Berlin, 10 weeks in
England (Cambridge, Oxford and London) and 3 months in the USA on an
official mission for the Ministry of Agriculture to gather information on the
international competition which Soviet agriculture faced. His most intensive
agricultural investigations took place in the USA where he had many dis-
cussions with public officials in Washington from the Secretary of Agriculture,
Henry Wallace, downwards. He also took the opportunity to meet economists
with kindred interests. In England he met Keynes, visited the London School
of Economics and the Royal Statistical Society. He met Irving Fisher at a
meeting of the American Economic Association in Chicago. He participated
in a conference of agronomists in Cornell University in Ithaca, where he met
Kuznets’ older brother, Solomon, who was teaching there. His most extensive
discussions and subsequent correspondence related to his work on cycles were
with Wesley Mitchell in New York. Mitchell was briefed on Kondratieff’s
work by Simon Kuznets who was his Ph. D. student at the time. It is not clear
whether Kuznets talked to Kondratieff in New York, but they probably met in
Cornell (6).
In the 1920s, there was freedom to exchange opinions and criticise official
policy in the USSR which disappeared in 1928. Within the Institute, Kon-
dratieff submitted his work to detailed comment by his colleagues. The report
of a 1926 discussion reads like a session reported nowadays in Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity. Kondratieff (1925b) presented a 67 page paper
(a revision of his first long wave paper of Kondratieff 1925a). It was subjected
to an 81 pages critique by D. I. Oparin, 22 pages of comment by seven other
colleagues, a 40 pages reply by Kondratieff, a 17 pages reply from Oparin, and
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46 pages of tables and notes. (see Kondratieff and Oparin 1928 and its full
translation in Makasheva et al. 1998, vol. 1).
Kondratieff distinguished three kinds of cycle: long ones of 50-year-dura-
tion, middle ones of 7 to 10 years, and short ones of 3 to 4 years. He measured
the long cycles by a double decomposition of time series—eliminating the
trend and showing a secondary movement—a 9-year moving average of the
deviations from trend. Nine-year averaging was enough to remove the influ-
ence of the two shorter types of cycle. His analysis covered the period 1770 to
the 1920s and the duration of his long cycles ranged from 40 to 60 years.
Kondratieff also adjusted his series to eliminate the population component, in
which some Kuznetsians (Brinley Thomas and Richard Easterlin) found the
best evidence for their own long-wave analysis.
Kondratieff’s waves were most clearly demonstrated by long-term move-
ments in wholesale prices, though some of the long-term oscillation was
obviously attributable to wars (e.g., the peaks in the Napoleonic wars and
1914–1920). He analysed wholesale price developments for France, the UK,
and the USA, and it is not surprising that in these relatively open economies
he found price trends to be similar. After he adjusted to eliminate the effect of
exchange rate changes, the individual country series gained greater synchro-
nicity. On this basis Kondratieff claimed his waves to be an international
phenomenon.
Most of Kondratieff’s other indicators contained a strong price element,
because they were expressed in current values: e.g., wages, interest rates, the
value of foreign trade, and bank deposits. Not surprisingly, the price com-
ponent of these value series moved in a similar way as the general price
indices (7). The only physical series were those relating to per capita coal
production in England, coal consumption in France, pig iron and lead pro-
duction in England.
Kondratieff concluded tentatively that, on the basis of available data, it was
very probable that there had been three long cycles in economic life (a rather
vague term, but one that is clearly intended to include output as well as price
movements). His chronology referred not to particular years but to spans, and
he distinguished only two phases, the rise and fall, in each wave. He did not
discuss the amplitudes of these waves, which varied between series. His dating
is shown in Table 1.
There are several problems with Kondratieff’s approach. The first is his
failure to establish that long waves exist as more than a monetary phenom-
enon. He failed to show the existence of broad movements in the volume of
output that even remotely correspond to our present measures of aggregate
Table 1 Kondratieff’s long-wave chronology
Rise Decline
First long wave 1780s–1790s to 1810–1817 1810–1817 to 1844–1851
Second long wave 1844–1851 to 1870–1875 1870–1875 to 1890–1896
Third long wave 1890–1896 to 1914–1920 1914–1920 to ?
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economic activity. The second problem was that he eliminated the trend and
discarded it as if it were irrelevant to the discussion.
Between 1820 and 2001, British GDP rose 33-fold, and American by 635-
fold. This fact is left out when the time series are decomposed in Kondratieff
fashion for wave analysis, but such very different trends transform the nature
and operational significance of any long waves that may be discerned. The
third problem is that double decomposition of time series to eliminate trend
and smooth out cycles blurs the impact of major historical events. Thus,
Kondratieff’s chronology pays no attention to the impact of the First World
War, and later long-wave analysts tend to brush off the catastrophic 1929–
1933 recession and the Second World War as well. Finally, Kondratieff threw
out some hints on long-cycle causality, but did not adequately explain why
capitalist development should involve long waves as a systematic phenome-
non.
There is no doubt that Kondratieff’s contribution to long-wave analysis was
fundamental. He formulated the three-cycle schema adopted by Schumpeter,
and his statistical technique was very similar to that Kuznets used to distin-
guish ‘secondary secular movements’. Furthermore, he pointed to the likeli-
hood of poor terms of trade for agriculture in periods of decelerated
development—a point given major stress later by Walt Rostow and Arthur
Lewis (see Kondratieff 1928b).
Outside his own Institute, Kondratieff was heavily cricised because his long
cycle analysis seemed to conflict with the more fundamental Marxist expec-
tation of the ultimate breakdown of capitalism (see Garvy 1943). He was
dismissed from the Institute in 1928 ‘‘for introducing ideology alien to Soviet
policy into his work’’. The Institute was merged with the Central Statistical
Office in 1928 and abolished in 1929. Kondratieff was arrested and interro-
gated in 1930, sentenced to 8 years in prison in 1932 and executed after a
second trial in 1938. His alleged counter-revolutionary crimes were not
attributable to his long-cycle analysis, but his public opposition to the Stalinist
collectivization of agriculture (in which he was associated with his friend
Chayanov, who was also executed). Kondratieff’s wife and daughter preserved
his unpublished work and pressed for his rehabilitation. During Khruschev’s
1963 thaw the 1938 death sentence was repealed, and in 1987, with Gorba-
chev’s glasnost, the 1932 sentence was also repealed. Menshikov (1984) in
1984 published the first article on Kondrieff’s work in the USSR since the
1920s, and in the 1990s, Kondratieff’s work was republished in Russia (see
Makasheva, p xxxiii).
5 Kuznets (1901–1985)
Chronologically, the next development in the long-swing literature was Simon
Kuznets’ analysis of ‘secondary secular movements’ published in 1930.
Kuznets was educated in Kharkov and worked in the Ukrainian Statistical
Office before emigrating to New York in 1922. He was already a sophisticated
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and well-trained economist. His research interest centred on business cycles
and long waves in economic activity. At that time, analysis of this field was
more sophisticated in Russia than in the United States. Tugan-Baranowsky
and Eugen Slutsky were both teaching in the Ukraine when Kuznets was a
student and he was very familiar with Kondratieff’s work on long waves. His
basic technique for identifying long waves was similar to that of Kondratieff,
i.e. it involved elimination of the trend from the basic annual data, and used a
nine-year moving average to smooth the deviations from trend. The latter he
called secondary secular variations. However, Kuznets made a special point of
not eliminating population movements, his technique for eliminating trend
was different from that of Kondratieff, and his conclusions were also different.
Kuznets’ evidence was more detailed, involving careful analysis of 59 series,
most of which represented annual movements in physical output and the
relevant price variance for particular commodities. He presented 23 indicators
for the USA, of which 16 were commodities with both price and quantity data
and six were financial indicators (including the general price index). For the
UK he had nine indicators, France and Germany eight each, Belgium five,
Canada and Japan two each, Australia and Argentina one each. He did not
claim that the individual indicators could be added to provide a meaningful
picture of aggregate economic activity, and he did not use aggregative sector
indicators for agriculture or manufacturing that were available when he wrote.
His major conclusions were: (a) that ‘‘secondary secular variations in pro-
duction are in most cases similar to those in prices, the latter following a rather
general course in agreement with the well-known historical periods of the rise
and fall in the general price level’’ (p 197); (b) he found a much shorter
periodicity than Kondratieff, ‘‘about 22 years as the duration of a complete
swing for production and 23 years for prices’’ (p 206); (c) most fundamentally,
he did not think there was enough evidence to conclude that these secondary
secular variations were systematic. They were ‘‘rather specific, historical
occurrences’’ (p 258) and there was ‘‘an absence of factors that would explain
the periodicity’’ (p 264). Kuznets did not attempt to cluster his individual
series to present a global chronology of long waves in economic life, nor did he
analyse the degree of synchronization of the series (8).
From 1930 onwards, Kuznets dropped his work on cycles and the indicator
approach, moved on to growth analysis and aggregate measures of economic
activity. He did fundamental definitional work on the scope and composition
of aggregate GDP measurement and produced historical estimates of US
economic development that conformed to his criteria. Thus he made it pos-
sible to analyse long-term movements in economic life on a much more sat-
isfactory conceptual basis than the cocktail approach that he and virtually all
cyclical analysts had previously been forced to use. Furthermore, Kuznets
successfully stimulated and inspired replication of his work by scholars in
many other countries. This aggregate accounting approach had some draw-
backs for cyclical analysis, before GDP estimates were available on a quar-
terly basis, but it revolutionized the study of long-term growth and greatly
facilitated the testing of long-wave analysis.
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From time to time after 1930 Kuznets returned to long-swing analysis in a
rather tentative way. Unlike his disciples, he himself never called them ‘cy-
cles’, as the word implied greater certainty about such phenomena and their
periodicity than Kuznets conceded. In Kuznets (1956, p 50) he showed an
‘‘internationally common chronology’’ of long swings for eight countries,
applying a different analytic technique from that he used in 1930, and different
indicators-decennial averages of population, GDP and GDP per capita. In
Kuznets (1971, pp 43–50), a rewritten version of the 1956 paper, he was more
cautious about synchronicity. His most affirmative position was in his 1958
essay on population growth, where he found the long-swing hypothesis
plausible in relation to US population growth and to ‘‘population-sensitive’’
components of capital formation such as housing and railway construction (9).
6 Abramovitz (1912–2000)
Although Kuznets had abandoned long-swing analysis, he had several disci-
ples with a continuing interest in what Arthur Lewis called ‘Kuznets Cycles’
(10). Moses Abramovitz made the most ambitious attempt to discern long
swings in aggregate US economic activity and veered between more positive
affirmation of long swings than Kuznets and outright recantation, in the sense
that he did not find valid evidence for the phenomenon in the postwar period.
His work in this field was almost entirely concerned with the US economy.
Abramovitz distinguished waves of acceleration and retardation in US
growth with an average duration for the full swing of 14 years and a variance
from 6 to 21 years, using NBER reference cycle indicators back to the 1820s.
He used a cocktail of 29 indicators including GNP. He smoothed his series by
a rather complicated procedure, designed to eliminate NBER reference cy-
cles, before removing the trend. He found that the turning points of his dif-
ferent series ‘‘cluster in relatively narrow bands of years’’. He therefore
produced a general chronology with nine swings between 1814 and 1939.
Even at his most affirmative, Abramovitz was basically cautious about the
nature of long swings. Thus in 1959 he wrote: ‘‘It is not yet known whether
they are the result of some stable mechanism inherent in the structure of the
US economy, or whether they are set in motion by the episodic occurrence of
wars, financial panics, or other unsystematic disturbances’’. In 1968 he con-
cluded that Kuznets cycles were ‘‘a form of growth which belonged to a
particular period in history’’ (1840–1914), and had disappeared thereafter. He
was somewhat miffed by the fact that Kuznets showed little interest in his
work on ‘‘Kuznets’ cycles’’ (see Abramovitz 2000, p 111).
7 Schumpeter (1883–1950)
The most complex cycle system was propounded by Joseph Schumpeter. He
incorporated Kondratieff long waves of 50 years, on each of which he
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superimposed 8 to 9-year ‘Juglars’. Within each Juglar, he showed three 40-
month ‘Kitchin’ cycles (see Chart I in Schumpeter 1939, pp 213, and 1051). He
said nothing about the amplitude of these cycles. Schumpeter insisted on the
empirical regularity of his schema as if the basic facts about the three cycle
components were well established, whereas there is great doubt about all
three, as well as the legitimacy of his nomenclature. Kitchin’s paltry contri-
bution to the literature in 1923 was lean meat indeed compared with that of
the NBER, and Juglar never claimed to have demonstrated the existence of an
8 to 9-year rhythm. In fact, the NBER had already demonstrated rather wide
variance in the length of cycles, so that there was little ground for distin-
guishing Juglars and Kitchins.
Schumpeter’s treatment of statistical material was illustrative rather than
analytic and was at times rather cavalier. In Schumpeter (1939) he used
business annals of the type favoured by his former colleague Spiethoff (1873–
1957), or by Tugan-Baranowsky, both of whom had an obvious influence on
his views. He also used NBER type of statistical ‘cocktail’ material in pulse
charts of industrial production, prices, interest rates, deposits, and currency
circulation (p 465). He made passing reference to national income analysis (p
561), but elsewhere referred to the concept of total output as a ‘‘meaningless
heap’’ (p 484), national income as a ‘‘highly inconvenient composite’’ (p 561).
Schumpeter’s long-wave chronology (see Table 2) was rather similar to that
of Kondratieff (see Table 1), though he gave each a name and divided each
wave into four phases rather than two (11).
Schumpeter’s cycle analysis ran to 1,050 pages and was highly discursive.
Judged on its statistical evidence alone, it would have been long discredited.
Its power lies in the imaginative theory he supplied to explain long waves and
the highly illuminating commentary on many aspects of German, British, and
American economic history. He argued that each wave represented a major
upsurge in innovation and entrepreneurial dynamism. Although writing in the
late 1930s, he was remarkably sanguine about the long-run productive po-
tential of capitalism. For him, depressions were a necessary part of the capi-
talist process. They were a period of creative destruction, during which old
products, firms, and entrepreneurs were eliminated and new products were
conceived. Schumpeter (1943, p 64) dismissed the 1929–1933 recession much
too lightly ‘‘the depression that ran its course from the last quarter of 1929 to
the third quarter of 1932 does not prove that a secular break has occurred in
Table 2 Schumpeter’s long-wave chronology
Prosperity Recession Depression Revival
Industrial revolution Kondratieff (cotton textiles, iron, and steam power)
1787–1800 1801–1813 1814–1827 1828–1842
Bourgeois Kondratieff (railroadization)
1843–1857 1858–1869 1870–1885 1886–1897
Neomercantilist Kondratieff (electricity, automobiles, chemicals)
1898–1911 1912–1925 1925–1939 ?
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the propelling mechanism of capitalist production because depressions of such
severity have repeatedly occurred-roughly once in every 55 years’’. He then
quoted the 1873–1877 period as if it were a precedent for 1929–1933. Such a
comparison was totally misleading. In the earlier period the peak-trough fall
in US industrial production was 14.8%; in the later one, 44.7%! There was no
earlier parallel to the 1929–1933 collapse either in amplitude or international
incidence.
Like most long-wave analysts, Schumpeter gave primary stress to autono-
mous features of the capitalist process and said very little about the role of
government in economic life. When he did mention government, it was usually
to scorn its perversity-as in his attack on Roosevelt’s New Deal—though he
regarded government as pretty impotent. For him the driving force in eco-
nomic life was entrepreneurship, which he regarded as having been taken over
more or less completely by large firms. The emphasis on entrepreneurship was
present in his earliest work on capitalist development written in 1911, and was
obviously influenced by the ideas of Max Weber and Werner Sombart, which
were popular at that time.
The main weaknesses of Schumpeter’s long-wave theory (ignoring his
failure to demonstrate their existence in the real world) were threefold: (a) he
did not explain why innovation and entrepreneurial drive should come in
regular waves rather than in a continuous but irregular stream, which seems a
more plausible hypothesis for analysis concerned with the economy as a
whole; (b) he made no distinction between the lead country and the others,
but argued as if they were all operating on the same level of productivity and
technological opportunity. Thus his waves of innovation were expected to
affect all countries simultaneously; (c) he greatly exaggerated the scarcity of
entrepreneurial ability and its importance as a factor of production.
Schumpeter extended his analysis of capitalist development further in 1943
in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. It was not concerned with long
waves but with capitalist breakdown. This was paradoxical coming from an
analyst who had such great faith in its robust character. However, his
breakdown theory was sociopolitical rather than economic. He argued that
there were four major forces destroying capitalism. In the first place, entre-
preneurship was likely to be stifled by bureaucratization of management and
decision-making in large firms. The second menace was the disincentive of
progressive taxation and the increasing power of trade unions, which had
already (he argued) retarded US recovery in the 1930s and were likely to
become more stifling. The third threat came from the growing power of so-
cialist ideas, and the fourth from the unpopularity of capitalism with intel-
lectuals, who were continually engaged in denunciatory activities and
harassments such as anti-trust suits.
Schumpeter’s approach to long waves and the breakdown of capitalism
contained bold hypotheses and unsettling paradoxes, which gained in impact
through his emotional detachment. His view of capitalist development was
fatalistic, and he wrote as if he were charting destiny. He disliked most of what
was happening in the real world, but did not advocate policies to remedy the
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predicted catastrophe. In fact, one is never sure with Schumpeter whether he
was putting forward a specific hypothesis because he seriously believed it or
because it stimulated interest in his fundamentally dynamic and original
conception of capitalist development.
8 Long-wave revivalists
The significant slowdown in the momentum of economic growth after 1973
revived the notion of long rhythms in economic life and a number of new long-
wave pundits emerged, most of them neo-Schumpeterians. Some were vul-
garizers of past long-wave theories, which they invoked uncritically in support
of a fashionable gloom about the future (12). Others deserve critical inspec-
tion, though I have not found much in their work to shake my scepticism
about long waves as a systematic phenomenon affecting output.
9 Rostow (1916–2003)
Walt Rostow’s interest in ‘Kondratieff’ movements was concentrated on
swings in the terms of trade of primary producers against those selling
industrial goods. From his viewpoint the 1951–1973 period was the ‘down-
swing’ of a fourth Kondratieff, and the OPEC-inspired price increases marked
the upswing of a fifth Kondratieff. He produced 800 pages of empirical
material to back his thesis, in welcome contrast to some of his earlier work.
However, he complicated his argument by embedding his long waves in a
loosely integrated framework that featured neo-Schumpeterian surges of
innovation in leading sectors, demand changes as economies work themselves
through a hierarchy of stages, and a reiteration of his earlier erroneous belief
that there was a short, sharp take-off in Western countries which was stag-
gered in time. Rostow (1978) placed great emphasis on a mishmash of sectoral
and commodity indicators and had little time for broad aggregates such as
GDP, which to my mind are the central indicators to be used in measuring
acceleration or deceleration of growth.
10 Mandel (1923–1995)
Ernest Mandel was an erudite Belgian Marxist of Trotskyite persuasion. He
asserted that there are long swings, roughly 50 years in length, caused by
surges of new technology. In each swing there were two phases. In the first,
profit rates rise as new technology is developed, and in the second they fall as
technical possibilities are exhausted. The timing, like the causality, is similar
to Schumpeter’s. His first wave, from the 1780s to 1847 was attributed to the
‘industrial revolution’; the second, from 1847s to the 1890s, to a technological
revolution dominated by ‘machine production of steam motors’; the third,
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from the 1890s to 1939, to ‘machine production of electric and combustion
motors’; and the fourth, from 1940 to a future unspecified date, with machine
production of electronic motors and atomic energy. He suggests that the first
phase of the fourth wave ended in 1967 and that we were in the second phase
at the time he was writing. Unlike other writers in this vein, he did not refer to
the waves as ‘Kondratieffs’. He considered Kondratieff unoriginal as com-
pared with van Gelderen, for whose work he had exaggerated respect (13).
Mandel was mainly interested in theory and his empirical underpinning was
very weak. He claimed (p 137) that ‘economic historians are practically
unanimous’ in distinguishing expansions and recessions in the periods he used
in his periodization, but the only justification he gave was an article by Hans
Rosenberg (1943) published in 1943, which itself contained no empirical
material and was written before quantitative economic history began. Mandel
also presented estimates of world trade and industrial production indices for
the UK, Germany, and the USA to buttress his argument. These were not
deviations from detrended moving averages, but compound rates of growth
between the years specified (which varied by type of indicator).
Table 3 shows Mandel’s indicators for his second-wave downswing, which
he called a period of ‘pronounced depression’, and for his third-wave upswing,
which he characterised as a period of ‘tempestuous increase in economic
activity’. Mandel’s statistical evidence does not warrant such dramatic lan-
guage. It is even less appropriate if one uses my alternative measures in the
lower panel (from more recent sources referring to exactly the same periods
and concepts).






increase in economic activity
Mandel’s indicators
UK industrial output 1.2 (1876–1893) 2.2 (1894–1913)
Germany industrial output 2.5 (1875–1892) 4.3 (1893–1913)
USA industrial output 4.9 (1874–1893) 5.9 (1894–1913)








Source Top five rows from Mandel (1975), pp 141–142 (omitting his citation of Dupriez’s 1947
estimates of world per capita output as these were much too shaky for serious use in this context).
Bottom five rows from industrial production including construction for the UK, Germany, and the
USA for Mandel’s periods from Lewis (1978); world trade volume from Maddison (1962)
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11 Mandel’s stages of development
Mandel identified ‘‘stages’’ as well as ‘‘waves’’. Here he was influenced by
Lenin’s (1916) essay on ‘‘Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism’’. He
was mainly concerned with ‘‘late capitalism’’ but, interestingly enough, he did
not consider it to be a new stage but merely a development within imperialist
monopoly-capitalism, which Lenin had distinguished from a first phase of
‘‘free competition’’.
At first sight this is puzzling, for Mandel frequently refers to features of
‘late capitalism’ (the enhanced role of the state in the economy, the formal
ending of colonialism, the importance of military spending, and the changed
international power locus) that seem rather different from those described by
Lenin. The reason for Mandel’s position is explained in his 1975 book (pp
524–525), where he dissociated himself from ‘‘revisionists’’, such as John
Strachey (1956), who claimed that there was a new-era mixed economy that
can ‘suspend the internal economic contradictions of capitalism’.
Thus there was no real connection between Mandel’s stages of growth and
his long waves. The latter were the fruit of more or less exogenous techno-
logical development, and did not have the policy-institutional flavour that
Schumpeter conferred on his by calling one ‘bourgeois’ and another ‘neo-
mercantilist’.
12 Mensch
Gerhard Mensch (1975), another long-wave revivalist, had a neo-Schumpe-
terian approach and a detailed catalogue of different types of innovation. He
considered that the clustering of innovations determined the tempo of capi-
talist performance, and that the 1970s slowdown was due to a shortage of
exploitable innovations and market saturation. He had interesting ideas about
lags in application of inventions, but lapsed frequently into apocalyptic ser-
monizing. He concentrated on illustrative examples of ‘‘industrial evolution’
and presented almost no quantitative evidence on variations in the pace of
macroeconomic performance he was presumably trying to explain. He did not
discuss inter-country diffusion of innovations, and nowhere made the
lead-follower dichotomy, which is fundamental in analysis of technological
diffusion.
13 Conclusions on long-wave theories
My basic conclusion is that the existence of a regular long-term rhythms in
economic activity is not proven, although many fascinating hypotheses have
been developed in looking for them. Nevertheless, it is clear that major
changes in growth momentum have occurred since 1820, and some expla-
nation is needed. In my view it should not be sought in systematic waves, but
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in specific disturbances of an ad hoc character (14). Major system shocks
have changed the momentum of capitalist development at certain points.
Sometimes they were more or less accidental in origin; sometimes they oc-
curred because some inherently unstable arrangement could no longer be
sustained and finally broke down (e.g., the Bretton Woods fixed exchange
rate system). Changes in the institutional-policy mix play a bigger role in
capitalist development than many long-wave theorists would admit. A sys-
tem shock will produce the need for new policy instruments. These are not
always selected on the most rational basis, and they may require a long
period of experiment before they work properly. There may be conflicts
of interest within and between countries which prevent the emergence of
efficient policies. Hence there have been prolonged periods in which supply
potential was not fully exploited. Some of these problems figure in
Schumpeter’s analysis but he usually sees the solution as a matter of destiny
rather than choice.
Capitalist development since 1820 has a certain unity because economic
growth in all phases has been much more rapid than in the merchant capitalist
epoch from 1500 to 1820. Nevertheless, there have been big changes which
influenced the type of fluctuations that were experienced in the advanced
capitalist economies. These changes have to be kept in mind in constructing
any general theory of fluctuations or phases. Increased levels of income and
changed patterns of demand and productivity have changed the structure of
production and employment. In 1820, agriculture characteristically employed
well over half of the labour force in these countries, whereas the average is
now nearer 3%. Agriculture was and still is subject to erratic fluctuations in
output owing to weather, and its products have generally been sold in flexprice
markets in which prices go down as well as up. This erratic element in eco-
nomic life is much smaller than it used to be.
Industry provided about a quarter of total employment around 1820 and
rose towards a peak of somewhere round 40% in 1970 in my 16-country
sample. Hence the process of capitalist development is often referred to as
industrialization. However, the industrial share of employment has been on
the decline for more than 30 years, and has now regressed closer to the 1820
proportion than to its peak level. The big long-run gains have been in services,
which accounted for a fifth of total employment in 1820 against three-quarters
now. It was in the industrial sector that the business cycle was most marked in
terms of demand fluctuation and stock-output supply adjustments, but in the
service sector both demand and supply have been more stable, and this has
dampened the amplitude of fluctuations in GDP.
A second major change in economic life has been the growing role of
government. In 1820 government spending was typically less than 10% of
GDP, but the proportion is now much bigger. In the advanced capitalist
countries, governments intervene on a massive scale to operate a vast network
of social transfers, which change the distribution of income and the pattern of
private spending. Total government spending (including transfers) in our 16
countries is now nearly half of GDP.
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The government regulatory role in the economy has greatly increased. One
result of the latter is that the stability of financial institutions has improved.
Before the Second World War, depressions were often reinforced by major
bank failures, but these are now rarer and their impact is cushioned. As a
result of these changes, government exercises both a propulsive and a com-
pensatory role in economic life, which generally operates to stabilize the
expenditure and income flow, and the aspirations of governments to act as
managers of economic destiny have greatly increased.
There are also other changes to keep in mind when developing hypotheses
intended to cover the whole capitalist period. One important one is the change
in the average size of firms, and the role of trade unions. Hence, the atomized
market paradigm is less relevant in wage and price fixing, which explains some
of the changes that have occurred in price behaviour. Another is the character
of international linkages between countries, the degree to which trade, capital
and migration are subject to restrictions and the scope for international
transfers of technology. These have varied a good deal over time and have
been the most exposed to system shock. There have also been big changes in
the international monetary system, which have had a major impact on the type
of policy weapons used domestically.
14 Phases of growth
Although I find no convincing evidence in the work of Kondratieff and
Schumpeter to support the notion of regular or systematic long waves in
economic life, there have nevertheless been significant changes in the
momentum of capitalist development. These changes in momentum can be
seen clearly in our first four graphs, which make binary comparisons of growth
performance 1820–2001 in the biggest countries, i.e., France/USA, Germany/
USA, Japan/USA, and UK/USA.
Since 1820 one can identify separate phases which have meaningful internal
coherence in spite of wide variations in individual country performance within
each of them. Comparative performance is quantified in detail in Tables 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13.
Phases are identified, in the first instance, by inductive analysis and iterative
inspection of empirically measured characteristics. Annual estimates were
derived for as many years as possible since 1820, including war years.
Aggregate performance of the sixteen countries is also shown, with both
weighted and unweighted averages. For many purposes the unweighted
average is the most relevant indicator of the characteristic experience of these
countries. The weighted average is a useful supplement, but it should not be
forgotten that the USA now has a very large weight in this measure.
My preference is for measures of annual movements in aggregate activity
(GDP), which reveal clearly the big changes in the severity of recessions that
have appeared systematically across the sixteen advanced capitalist countries
shown in Table 4. It is clear that peacetime business cycle history has been
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Table 4 Amplitude of recessions in aggregate output 1820–2001 (maximum peak-trough fall in
GDP or lowest rise) (annual data)
1820–1870 1870–1913 1914–1919 1920–1938 1939–1949 1950–1973 1973–2001
Australia –13.9 –17.1 –6.6 –15.6 –11.6 0.7 –0.9
Austria –2.3 –38.2 –22.5 –58.7 0.1 –0.4
Belgium 0.0 –0.2 –32.2 –7.9 –25.5 –0.8 –1.5
Canada –8.8 –6.7 –29.6 –4.1 0.7 –3.0
Denmark –5.6 –2.7 –11.8 –2.9 –22.5 0.6 –1.6
Finland –4.3 –33.0 –4.0 –9.3 0.7 –10.4
France –7.6 –8.2 –36.1 –14.7 –53.1 2.5 –1.0
Germany –2.4 –3.2 –30.4 –16.9 –62.2 0.3 –2.9
Italy –6.7 –16.7 –10.1 –43.8 1.9 –2.1
Japan –7.4 –3.0 –7.3 –51.7 4.7 –1.7
Netherlands –4.5 –5.9 –12.2 –9.5 –50.1 –0.3 –1.7
Norway –0.5 –12.4 –8.3 –16.7 –0.9 –0.1
Sweden –9.7 –5.5 –15.5 –6.2 –3.0 0.5 –4.7
Switzerland –17.3 –11.2 –11.5 –8.0 –4.0 –2.1 –8.6
UK –7.0 –4.1 –10.9 –10.4 –13.4 –0.6 –2.9
USA –8.2 –7.7 –28.5 –25.0 –1.0 –1.9
Arithmetic average –7.6 –6.0 –17.8 –12.7 –28.4 0.4 –2.8
Weighted average
–3.1 –6.3 –16.4 –22.5 1.1 0.1
Source Maddison (2003). Figures are adjusted to exclude the impact of frontier change. In the first
column, estimates for Germany and Switzerland are for the period 1850–1870, 1830–1870 for the
UK, and 1846–1870 for Belgium
Table 5 Growth of GDP at constant 1990 prices, 1500–2001 (annual average compound growth
rate)
1500–1820 1820–1870 1870–1913 1913–1950 1950–1973 1973–2001 1820–2001
Australia –0.01 7.28 3.44 2.47 4.60 3.26 4.41
Austria 0.33 1.45 2.41 0.25 5.35 2.38 2.06
Belgium 0.41 2.24 2.02 1.03 4.08 2.14 2.15
Canada 0.62 4.42 4.02 2.94 4.98 2.95 3.86
Denmark 0.38 1.91 2.66 2.55 3.81 2.06 2.48
Finland 0.60 1.58 2.74 2.69 4.94 2.57 2.66
France 0.37 1.43 1.63 1.15 5.05 2.20 1.99
Germany 0.37 2.00 2.81 0.30 5.68 1.75 2.26
Italy 0.21 1.24 1.94 1.49 5.64 2.30 2.17
Japan 0.31 0.41 2.44 2.21 9.29 2.71 2.71
Netherlands 0.56 1.70 2.16 2.43 4.74 2.46 2.46
Norway 0.54 1.70 2.12 2.93 4.06 3.30 2.60
Sweden 0.66 1.62 2.17 2.74 3.73 1.83 2.28
Switzerland 0.52 1.91 2.55 2.60 4.51 1.16 2.41
UK 0.80 2.05 1.90 1.19 2.93 2.08 1.95
USA 0.86 4.20 3.94 2.84 3.93 2.94 3.63
Arithmetic average 0.47 2.32 2.56 1.99 4.83 2.38 2.63




much milder since the Second World War than before, and that the 1920–1938
period was generally much worse than 1870–1913. Except in 1929–1933, when
depression hit every country, the weighted average of cyclical movements for
the sixteen countries as a group was dampened by the fact that individual
country cycles were not synchronized. Table 12 shows the cyclical record for
foreign trade. It confirms the pattern shown by GDP movements, with notably
smaller cycles since the Second World War.
Table 10 shows the amplitude of annual changes in aggregate GDP for the
sixteen countries taken together for the period 1871–2001. For this period we
have complete information on annual movement of GDP for all sixteen
countries (2,096 readings). Table 11 shows the incidence of recession by
country for every year between 1871 and 2001. The biggest interruptions to
growth occurred in 1914–1919, the 1930–1932 depression, and the 1945–1946
period of demobilization, dismemberment, defeat, and victory. All other
Table 6 Growth of per capita GDP at constant 1990 prices, 1500–2001 (annual average
compound growth rate)
1500–1820 1820–1870 1870–1913 1913–1950 1950–73 1973–2001 1820–2001
Australia 0.08 3.36 1.06 0.99 2.43 1.90 2.09
Austria 0.17 0.85 1.45 0.18 4.94 2.12 1.56
Belgium 0.13 1.44 1.05 0.70 3.54 1.95 1.54
Canada 0.26 1.27 2.27 1.35 2.83 1.72 1.79
Denmark 0.17 0.91 1.57 1.56 3.08 1.83 1.62
Finland 0.17 0.76 1.44 1.91 4.25 2.19 1.82
France 0.14 1.01 1.45 1.12 4.04 1.71 1.63
Germany 0.14 1.08 1.61 0.17 5.02 1.60 1.59
Italy 0.00 0.59 1.26 0.85 4.95 2.10 1.58
Japan 0.09 0.19 1.48 0.88 8.06 2.14 1.91
Netherlands 0.28 0.81 0.90 1.07 3.45 1.83 1.37
Norway 0.17 0.52 1.30 2.13 3.19 2.83 1.73
Sweden 0.17 0.66 1.46 2.12 3.06 1.52 1.58
Switzerland 0.17 1.32 1.66 2.06 3.08 0.72 1.68
UK 0.27 1.26 1.01 0.93 2.42 1.86 1.37
USA 0.36 1.34 1.82 1.61 2.45 1.86 1.73
Arithmetic average 0.17 1.09 1.42 1.23 3.80 1.87 1.66
Weighted average 0.14 1.11 1.57 1.21 3.64 1.92 1.68
Source Maddison (2003)
Table 7 Growth characteristics of five phases of capitalist development, 1820–2001 (arithmetic
average of figures for the individual countries: annual average compound growth rates)
Phases GDP GDP per capita Volume of exports
1820–1870 2.32 1.09 4.2
1870–1913 2.56 1.42 3.9
1913–50 1.99 1.23 1.1
1950–73 4.83 3.80 8.6
1973–2001 2.38 1.87 5.0
Source Maddison (1991) and (2003), and Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13
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disturbances had a much milder impact on output. The aggregate stability in
the collective output of the group in peacetime has been quite impressive.
In the 43 years from 1870 to 1913, there were only 3 years of recession in
aggregate output, in the 27 years 1947–1973 none, and in the 28 years 1973–
2001 only one occasion when aggregate output fell. However, it is clear from
Table 11 that individual countries have been much more unstable than the
group as a whole. Their cyclical experience has not normally been synchro-
nized, but compensatory. Cyclical experience has been synchronized only
when they have been subjected to ‘system-shocks’ such as wars, or the collapse
of long-standing international payments mechanisms, as in the in the 33 years
1914–1946, there were 9 years in which aggregate GDP of the sixteen coun-
tries fell.
For 1820–1870, the statistical coverage is weaker. The annual estimates are
complete for Australia, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden. For
the UK there is coverage for 42 years, for Belgium for 27 years, 23 for Ger-
many and less elsewhere. Altogether there are 418 annual readings out of a
potential 800. However, judging from the evidence we have, it seems that
average cyclical experience in 1820–1870 was not too different from that of
1871–1913 Tables 12 and 13.
My primary interest is in identifying major changes in growth momentum
rather than shorter-term oscillations. There is a need for annual time series for
major indicators of aggregate economic activity for our sixteen countries in as
complete and comparable a form as possible and a special need to get cov-
erage for all of the countries for the initial benchmark year 1820. By inspec-
tion of the data and graphs derived from them, one can identify fundamental
turning points in growth momentum, and try to distiguish growth and cyclical
behaviour patterns that differ significantly between phases. The technique is
not unlike that of the NB ER in its attempt to identify reference cycles, and in














1820–1870 –7.6 n.a. n.a. –0.2a
1870–1913 –6.0 –18.2 4.5b 0.4
1920–38 –12.7 –36.5 7.3 –0.7c
1950–73 +0.4 –7.0 2.6 4.1




b UK and USA 1900–1913
c 1924–1938 for Austria and Germany, 1921–1938 for Belgium
Source Appendices to Maddison (1991, 1997, pp 472–473, 2001, p 134), OECD, Economic Out-
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particular does not involve elaborate decomposition of time series into dif-
ferent kinds of oscillatory movement. Simple techniques are almost inevitable
in handling information for sixteen countries, where each series, if it were
available for the full 181 years would involve more than 2,896 readings.
Tables 5 and 6 show growth performance (GDP and GDP per capita,
respectively) in the five phases (1820–1870, 1870–1913, 1913–1950, 1950–1973,
Table 10 Annual percentage change in agregate gdp (16 countries), 1871–2001
1871 2.3 1914 –6.3 1957 3.4
1872 3.7 1915 2.6 1958 1.1
1873 2.0 1916 7.9 1959 6.4
1874 3.7 1917 –2.3 1960 5.2
1875 3.2 1918 1.2 1961 4.2
1876 –1.1 1919 –3.0 1962 5.7
1877 1.8 1920 0.4 1963 4.7
1878 1.9 1921 –0.5 1964 6.4
1879 1.9 1922 7.0 1965 5.2
1880 6.2 1923 4.8 1966 5.6
1881 2.3 1924 5.5 1967 3.8
1882 4.1 1925 4.2 1968 5.8
1883 2.1 1926 3.5 1969 5.3
1884 1.2 1927 3.0 1970 3.4
1885 0.7 1928 3.4 1971 3.4
1886 2.4 1929 3.9 1972 5.1
1887 3.7 1930 –5.1 1973 5.9
1888 1.5 1931 –6.1 1974 0.7
1889 3.7 1932 –6.2 1975 0.1
1890 2.4 1933 2.0 1976 4.6
1891 1.3 1934 5.2 1977 3.6
1892 3.2 1935 5.5 1978 4.4
1893 –0.2 1936 8.3 1979 3.9
1894 2.1 1937 4.8 1980 1.1
1895 4.9 1938 0.6 1981 1.7
1896 1.4 1939 7.4 1982 –0.1
1897 3.6 1940 2.7 1983 2.8
1898 4.8 1941 8.0 1984 4.8
1899 4.8 1942 8.5 1985 3.5
1900 2.1 1943 9.3 1986 3.0
1901 3.6 1944 2.2 1987 3.3
1902 0.9 1945 –10.4 1988 4.4
1903 3.5 1946 –13.5 1989 3.6
1904 0.8 1947 2.3 1990 1.9
1905 4.2 1948 5.8 1991 0.8
1906 6.7 1949 4.2 1992 1.9
1907 3.2 1950 7.9 1993 1.2
1908 –3.1 1951 7.0 1994 3.1
1909 6.2 1952 4.1 1995 2.4
1910 1.2 1953 5.0 1996 2.8
1911 4.2 1954 2.4 1997 3.2
1912 4.0 1955 6.9 1998 2.9






Table 11 Incidence of recessions in GDP, by country, 1871–2001 (number of falls in GDP and
countries in which GDP fell)
Year Falls Countries Year Falls Countries Year Falls Countries
1871 4 AFGN 1914 12 ATBCLFGIJNSE 1957 0
1872 3 CIZ 1915 7 ATBDLFG 1958 6 BNWZKE
1873 3 TDF 1916 4 ATSZ 1959 0
1874 2 NE 1917 11 ATBDLFNWSZE 1960 0
1875 4 BCSE 1918 11 ATBCDLFNWSZ 1961 0
1876 7 ACFGIJZ 1919 5 TCGIK 1962 0
1877 5 DLGSZ 1920 5 CIJKE 1963 0
1878 6 CLFJWS 1921 9 CDFIWSZKE 1964 0
1879 7 TFGNSZK 1922 1 J 1965 0
1880 1 G 1923 2 TG 1966 0
1881 3 LIJ 1924 1 W 1967 0
1882 3 AWZ 1925 1 D 1968 0
1883 2 IW 1926 1 K 1969 0
1884 1 F 1927 2 FI 1970 0
1885 5 TCFSK 1928 0 1971 0
1886 1 S 1929 4 ABCG 1972 0
1887 1 Z 1930 13 ATBCLFGIJNZKE 1973 0
1888 3 TJE 1931 14 ATBCLFGINWSZKE 1974 4 DJKE
1889 2 TI 1932 11 TBCDLFGNSZE 1975 10 TBDFGINZKE
1890 2 AN 1933 5 TCINE 1976 2 LZ
1891 5 LGJNZ 1934 3 BFN 1977 1 S
1892 5 ACLIK 1935 2 FZ 1978 1 T
1893 3 ACE 1936 0 1979 0
1894 3 IZE 1937 0 1980 2 DK
1895 3 ACF 1938 4 BFNE 1981 5 TBDNK
1896 4 CJNE 1939 2 LZ 1982 6 ACGNZE
1897 3 AFI 1940 8 TBDLFNWS 1983 0
1898 0 1941 6 BDFINZ 1984 0
1899 2 LJ 1942 8 TBFIJNWZ 1985 0
1900 2 FK 1943 6 BFINWZ 1986 .0
1901 6 ALFGSZ 1944 7 AFIJNWK 1987 0
1902 5 LFIJS 1945 10 ATCDLGIJKE 1988 1 W
1903 3 WZK 1946 5 ACGKE 1989 0
1904 2 WE 1947 2 KE 1990 1 G
1905 1 J 1948 0 1991 7 ACLSZKE
1906 0 1949 1 Z 1992 3 LSZ
1907 0 1950 1 K 1993 7 BLFGISZ
1908 6 CFSZKE 1951 0 1994 0
1909 3 TJS 1952 2 BK 1995 0
1910 2 FI 1953 0 1996 0
1911 0 1954 2 CE 1997 .0
1912 0 1955 0 1998 1 J
1913 1 Z 1956 0 1999 0
2000 0
2001 1 J
A Australia, T Austria, B Belgium, C Canada, D Denmark, L Finland, F France, G Germany,
I Italy, J Japan, N Netherlands,W Norway, S Sweden, Z Switzerland, K UK, E USA
Source Maddison (2003)
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Table 12 Amplitude of recessions in exports, 1870–2001 (maximum peak-trough fall or smallest
rise in volume, annual data)
1870–1913 1920–1938 1950–1973 1973–2001
Australia –32.2 –19.7 –7.6 –3.6
Austria (n.a.) –48.7 –7.3 –5.5
Belgium –13.1 –31.8 –9.6 –6.8
Canada –13.9 –40.6 –6.1 –10.3
Denmark –25.0 –20.3 –6.7 –4.1
Finland –20.9 –15.7 –13.4 –17.4
France –12.9 –47.3 –12.0 –4.0
Germany –14.2 –50.1 +2.3 –11.5
Italy –30.6 –69.1 –9.1 –8.5
Japan –23.7 –18.9 0.0 –10.9
Netherlands –14.8 –33.4 +2.6 –3.8
Norway –7.7 –16.0 –7.1 –3.3
Sweden –11.0 –37.0 –10.7 –11.6
Switzerland (n.a.) –50.2 –4.2 –8.2
UK –12.5 –37.7 –8.0 –2.2
USA –18.9 –47.8 –14.3 –18.8
Arithmetic average –18.0 –36.5 –7.0 –8.2
Source Maddison (1991, App. F, updated from 1985 from OECD, Economic Outlook, June 2003,
p 233. Dutch estimates for 1870–1913 supplied by Jan Pieter Smits
Table 13 Growth in volume of exports, 1720–2001 (annual average compound growth rate)
1720–1820 1820–70 1870–1913 1913–50 1950–73 1973–2001 1870–2001
Australia 4.8 1.3 5.8 5.3 4.0
Austria 4.7 3.5 –1.1 10.7 7.3 4.2
Belgium 5.3 4.2 0.3 9.2 4.4 4.0
Canada 4.1 3.1 7.0 5.7 4.7
Denmark 1.9a 3.7 2.4 6.9 4.7 4.1
Finland 3.9 1.9 7.2 4.6 4.0
France 1.0b 4.0 2.8 1.1 8.2 4.9 3.7
Germany 4.8c 4.1 –2.8 12.4 4.8 3.6
Italy 3.4 2.2 0.6 11.6 5.2 4.0
Japan 8.5 2.0 15.4 4.7 7.0
Netherlands –0.2 5.5 2.3d 1.5 10.4 4.4 3.9d
Norway 3.2 2.7 7.3 6.4 4.4
Sweden 3.1 2.8 6.9 4.5 4.0
Switzerland 4.1 3.9 0.3 8.1 3.0 3.4
UK 2.0 4.9 2.8 0.0 3.9 4.5 2.5
USA 4.7 4.9 2.2 6.3 5.6 4.5





Source Maddison (1991, p 75, updated and amended from Maddison 2001, p 361) and OECD,
Economic Outlook, June 2003. Dutch estimates for 1820–1913 supplied by Jan Pieter Smits
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and 1973 onwards) I have identified within the capitalist epoch. They also
compare the pace of progress in the capitalist epoch as a whole (1820 on-
wards), with that in the preceding merchant-capitalist epoch (1500–1820).
It is clear that growth momentum in the first phase (1820–1870) was much
faster than that in the merchant capitalist epoch; it accelerated somewhat in
1870–1913. 1913–1950 was the period when performance was worst. Extreme
shocks struck three times between 1914s and the 1940s. Performance in the
unprecedented postwar boom-the golden age, 1950–1973, was also very spe-
cial in Western Europe and Japan. The nature of the growth process changed
sharply after 1973.
Kuznets (1963), in his critique of Rostow’s stage schema (15), postulated
five minimum requirements for acceptable stages of growth: (a) they must be
identified by characteristics that can be verified or quantified; (b) the mag-
nitude of these characteristics must vary in some recognizable pattern from
one phase to another: ‘‘stages are presumably something more than successive
ordinates in the steadily climbing curve of growth. They are segments of that
curve with properties so distinct that separate study of each segment seems
warranted’’; (c) there should be some indication of when stages terminate and
begin and why; (d) it is necessary to identify the universe to which the stage
classification applies; (e) finally, Kuznets required that there be an analytic
relation between successive ‘‘stages’’, which, optimally, would make it possi-
ble to predict how long each stage has to run. This fifth requirement seems too
deterministic. It suggests that movements between successive stages are more
or less ineluctable. I have tried to fulfill Kuznets’ first four requirements, but
cannot meet his fifth condition. For this reason, I have called my periods
‘‘phases’’ rather than ‘‘stages’’. Tables 7 and 8 summarise the main kinds of
evidence I used.
My growth phases fulfil the first four Kuznets’ requirements as explained
below.
(a) They are identified by seven simple indicators: rate of growth of the
volume of output, output per head and exports: cyclical variations in
output and exports, unemployment, and rate of change in consumer
prices. These are the conventional macroeconomic indicators one might
use for growth accounting or conjunctural monitoring. The results are
shown in very aggregative form in Tables 7 and 8. Each phase also has
five non-quantifiable ‘system characteristics’, by which I mean the basic
policy approaches and institutional environment that condition growth
performance. Changes in these between periods are summarised in
Table 9 These include the government approach to demand manage-
ment (i.e., the kind of trade-off that is made between unemployment and
inflation), the bargaining power of labour, the degree of freedom for
trade and international factor movements, and the character of the
international payments mechanism.
(b) Most of these characteristics are systematically different in the phases
identified. Generally, they were most favourable in the ‘‘golden age’’
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1950–1973, second-best in the latest phase (1973 onwards), third-best in
the ‘liberal’phase and worst in the ‘beggar-your-neighbour’ phase’
(1913–1950).
(c) There is room for argument as to which years are turning points between
phases. I picked 1820 as the starting point for capitalist development. The
evidence now available suggests that the transition to the accelerated
growth that distinguishes capitalist from merchant capitalist momentum
took place after the Napoleonic wars rather than in 1760 as Kuznets
thought. There is also strong evidence that the acceleration of growth
was synchronous in western Europe from this time and not staggered
throughout the nineteenth century as Gerschenkron and Rostow be-
lieved. The year 1870 is an appropriate turning point as it marked the
emergence of Germany and Italy as integrated nation states, the emer-
gence of the new growth-oriented Meiji regime in Japan and a USA
reunited after civil war. The year 1913 is clearly the last year of a ‘liberal’
phase, which ended with the outbreak of the First World War. The year
1950 was the point where recovery from the Second World War was
completed and the previous peak in output for the sixteen countries as a
whole surpassed. However, five countries did not surpass their wartime
output peaks until 1953 (Austria, Germany, Japan, UK, and USA), so
one might well argue that 1953 rather than 1950 should mark the
beginning of the postwar golden age. On the other hand, there is a case
for starting in 1948, which is when the ground rules for international co-
operation within the capitalist group were set up by the Marshall Plan.
The year 1950 seems a reasonable compromise. It should be noted that
use of 1948–1973 or 1953–1973 instead of 1950–1973 would not affect the
analysis seriousl. This golden age would still be a period of secular boom
on an unparalleled scale, and the preceding phase, which encompassed
two world wars and a world depression would still have the worst per-
formance.
(d) The emergence of a new phase after 1973 is rather clear. The 1974–1975,
1980–1982 and 1991–1993 recessions affected virtually all sixteen coun-
tries. They were by far the biggest breaks in the postwar growth
momentum. The grounds for treating the post-1973 period as a new
phase include price, unemployment and output behaviour, changes in
the international monetary system, in government policy concerning the
level of demand, in expectations in the labour market, and greater
openness of capital markets. The economic system behaves in a different
way, which has created major new tasks for economic policy, and makes
it more difficult to reconcile different policy objectives. Table 8, shows a
breakdown within the latest phase of inflationary and unemployment
experience. A major reason for changes in macroeconomic objectives in
this period was the sharp acceleration in the rate of price rise from 1973
to 1983, due to the two oil shocks and the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods international payments system. This led countries to abandon
Keynesian full employment objectives in favour of deflationary policy.
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These drastic policy changes were successful in cutting the pace of
inflation after 1983, but much higher levels of unemployment became
endemic, except in the UK and USA where economic policy has been
more expansionist than was the case in most west European countries
and Japan. The income safety-net provided by extensive welfare pay-
ments in west European countries was an important influence cushioning
demand in a situation where recessionary experience might well have
been bigger.
15 Main conclusions on phases
(1) There have been five distinct phases of economic performance in the
capitalist epoch, each with its own momentum.
(2) Phases of growth are not ineluctable, and within each there is consid-
erable scope for variation in country performance; but the policy-insti-
tutional framework and policy attitudes characteristic of each phase have
had a striking distinctiveness and generality of acceptance. The expec-
tations of economic agents about growth and inflation have also had
distinctive characteristics which differed between phases.
(3) The transition from one phase to another was caused by system-shocks.
Some were due to a predictable breakdown of a basic characteristic of a
previous phase, but the timing of the change was usually governed by
exogenous or accidental events which are not predictable.
(4) The present phase generally ranks as second-best. Performance is well
below that in 1950–1973 in almost all important respects, but the econ-
omies have been a good deal more stable in real terms than before 1950,
and per capita output growth has been significantly better.
16 Endnotes
(1) William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882) initiated business cycle research in
England in 1862, by adjusting time series on business activity to eliminate
seasonal variation. He analysed longer term price movements in a brilliant
study (1863) of the impact of surging Californian and Australian gold produc-
tion in the 1850s. In 1878–1879, he estimated the average periodicity of
‘‘commercial crises’’, and the influence of variations in solar activity (sun-spots)
on agricultural output. His essays on these topics were collected and published
posthumously in 1884 (see Keynes’ 1936 assessment of Jevons’ work on cycles).
(2) See Burns and Mitchell, op. cit., p 270 states their reasons for not
eliminating trend: ‘‘cyclical fluctuations are so closely interwoven with these
secular changes in economic life that important clues to the understanding of
the former may be lost by mechanically eliminating the latter. It is primarily
for this reason that we take as our basic unit of analysis a business cycle that
includes that portion of secular trend falling within its boundaries.’’
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(3) In the period 1889–1978, the NBER recorded 21 reference cycles, the
industrial production index showed fifteen recessions, and GDP thirteen. The
average amplitude of GDP recessions was a 6.5% fall, and of industrial pro-
duction, 13.3%.
(4) Burns became less directly involved in NBER research in 1953, when he
was appointed chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors to President
Eisenhower. He was later Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, and
Ambassador to Germany. His successors in directing NBER research were
Soloman Fabricant 1952–1965; Geoffrey Moore 1965–1967; John Meyer 1967–
1977; and Martin Feldstein since 1977. Fabricant’s interests were close to
those of Kuznets. He published The Output of Manufacturing Industries,
1899–1937 in 1940, and Employment in Manufacturing, 1899–1939, in 1942.
Corresponding work on agriculture was produced by Barger and Landsberg in
1942, and on distribution by Barger in 1955. These buttressed the evidence on
US growth in Kuznets’ major studies published by NBER in the 1930s and
1940s (see detail in Publications, 1921–1990, NBER, 1990). A survey and
assessment of NBER work on business cycles from the 1920s to 1990s is
contained in Zarnowitz (1992).
(5) see the discussion in Freeman and Louc¸a˜ pp 73–74 on the work of the
Russian Marxist Parvus (pseudonym of Alexander Helfand 1869–1924), who
was the first to assert that capitalism was characterised by longer waves than
the business cycle-undulatory jumps in capital formation, followed by con-
tractions. These were ‘laws of capitalist oscillation’, but he presented no evi-
dence to back this idea. He influenced van Gelderen, who did a much better
job in providing statistical and annalistic evidence for the existence of long
waves, and made much less ambitious claims. DeWolff (1878–1960) a jewish
Dutch socialist, who survived the Nazi concentration camps, accepted and
extended van Gelderen’s work back to the 1820s in his 1924 contribution to
Kautsky’s Festschrift. Translations of Parvus and de Wolff can be found in
Louc¸a˜ and Reijnders.
(6) Kondratieff’s (1924–1925), trip is described in chapter 4 of Barnett
(1998). In a conversation with Kuznets in June 1980, I gathered that his
meeting with Kondratieff in Cornell was arranged by his brother Solomon.
(7) The most sophisticated discussion of the Kondratieff wave in prices for
the 1870–1913 period is contained in Lewis (1978), which examines whether
prices influenced output movements or output influenced prices. Lewis also
discusses the role of gold production. His conclusion is that the global price
movement in this period was most strongly influenced by US agricultural
production. Although Lewis uses personalized nomenclature for various cy-
cles and waves, as Schumpeter also did, he did not in fact endorse the idea of
Kondratieff waves as a non-monetary phenomenon on an international scale.
(8) See Burns and Mitchell, op. cit., p 428: ‘‘Kuznets did not draw up a list
of dates showing the peaks and troughs of his ‘secondary secular variations’. In
attempting to determine such a chronology from his American series, we
found their turning points so widely dispersed that we could have little con-
fidence in any list we ourselves might extract.’’
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(9) see ‘‘Long Swings in Population Growth and Related Economic Vari-
ables’’, reprinted in S. Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure, Heinemann,
London, 1965. See also S. Kuznets, Capital in the American Economy,
Princeton, 1961, Chapters 2, 7, 8 and 9.
(10) The others include Brinley Thomas (1954), Jeffrey Williamson (1964),
Richard Easterlin (1968) and Arthur Lewis (1978).
(11) In fact, Schumpeter was not too explicit on his chronology, which we
owe to Kuznets’ exegesis after consultation with Schumpeter; see Kuznets
(1940), for a highly sceptical assessment.
(12) See van Duin (1979), an eclectic revivalist, rather cavalier with the few
empirical facts he presented; and Forrester (1977), who produced long waves
with no data. Well documented scepticism about long waves can be found in
Schro¨der and Spree (1981), and Reijnders (1988).
(13) Kondratieff may not have proved much more than van Gelderen-i.e.,
that there were long swings in the general price level-but in terms of analytic
framework and statistical technique, what Kondratieff offered was distinctly
novel.
(14) Freeman and Louc¸a˜ (2001), p 97 present a taxonomy of alternative
approaches to analysis of long waves and phases of capitalist development.
Freeman classifies me, together with himself and Trotsky, as a practioner of
the historical approach. He classifies Kuznets and Kondratieff as practitioners
of the statistical or econometric approach.
(15) See S. Kuznets in W.W. Rostow (ed.), The Economics of Take-Off into
Sustained Growth, Macmillan, London, 1963.
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